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Abstract
In this paper, we examine the macroeconomic eﬀects of alternative ﬁscal consolida-
tion policies in the New Area-Wide Model (NAWM), a two-country open-economy
model of the euro area developed at the European Central Bank (cf. Coenen et al.,
2007). We model ﬁscal consolidation as a permanent reduction in the targeted gov-
ernment debt-to-output ratio and analyse both expenditure and revenue-based policies
that are implemented by means of simple ﬁscal feedback rules. We ﬁnd that ﬁscal
consolidation has positive long-run eﬀects on key macroeconomic aggregates such as
output and consumption, notably when the resulting improvement in the budgetary
position is used to lower distortionary taxes. At the same time, ﬁscal consolidation
gives rise to noticeable short-run adjustment costs in contrast to what the literature
on expansionary ﬁscal consolidations suggests. Moreover, depending on the ﬁscal in-
strument used, ﬁscal consolidation may have pronounced distributional eﬀects.
JEL Classiﬁcation System: E32, E62
Keywords: DSGE modelling, limited asset-market participation, ﬁscal policy, ﬁscal
consolidation, euro area5
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Non-Technical Summary
Since the launch of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), deﬁcits and/or debt levels
in a number of euro area countries have been lastingly above the reference values of the
Maastricht Treaty, which obliges Member States of the European Union to avoid deﬁcits
exceeding 3% of GDP and debt levels above 60% of GDP. A breach of the reference values
initiates an Excessive Deﬁcit Procedure (EDP) with the aim of examining and correcting the
ﬁscal imbalance in the respective country. Even though the public debate is largely centred
on the EDP prescriptions for correcting excessive deﬁcits, an EDP can also be launched
in case the debt-to-GDP ratio exceeds the reference value of 60%, unless it is diminishing
and approaching the reference value at a satisfactory pace. Indeed, amongst economists the
debt level relative to GDP, rather than the deﬁcit, is widely perceived as the more relevant
criterion from a longer-term sustainability point of view.
Against this background, we employ a calibrated open-economy model of the euro area—
the ECB’s New Area-Wide Model (NAWM), as described in Coenen et al. (2007)—to ex-
amine the long-run beneﬁts and the short-run adjustment costs of alternative debt consoli-
dation strategies. We model debt consolidation as a gradual reduction in the euro area debt
ratio from its current value of about 70% to a value of 60%, and analyse both expenditure
and revenue-based consolidation policies that are implemented by means of simple ﬁscal
feedback rules. While the literature suggests the existence of tradeoﬀs between the short
and the long-run eﬀects of ﬁscal consolidation policies, we are not aware of a systematic
model-based examination of the mechanisms behind their macroeconomic impact. In stan-
dard neoclassical models featuring a representative household, the role of ﬁscal policy is
extremely limited with government spending typically assumed to be exogenous and lump-
sum taxes/transfers balancing the ﬁscal authority’s budget. Thus, Ricardian equivalence
holds and the precise level of government debt is inessential since the representative house-
hold anticipates the future tax burden originating in the ﬁscal authority’s need to service,
and eventually repay government debt. The NAWM departs from this standard setting in
two important aspects. First, it distinguishes two types of households which diﬀer with
respect to their ability to participate in asset markets, with one type of household only
holding money as opposed to also trading bonds and accumulating physical capital. Due
to the existence of these two types of households, ﬁscal policies other than government
spending—notably transfers—have real eﬀects even though both types of households are6
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optimising subject to intertemporal budget constraints. Second, the NAWM incorporates
a relative rich set of distortionary taxes, including taxes on consumption purchases, labour
and capital income, as well as proﬁts, so that alternative ﬁscal policies, characterised by
the use of distinct instruments, can be analysed.
Employing the NAWM with its enhanced role for ﬁscal policy, we ﬁrst conﬁrm that
ﬁscal consolidation has positive long-run eﬀects on key macroeconomic aggregates such as
output and consumption, in particular when the resulting improvement in the budgetary
position is used to lower distortionary taxes. The key mechanism behind these positive
long-run eﬀects is the fact that a reduction in the amount of outstanding government debt
gives rise to an improvement in the ﬁscal authority’s budgetary position because interest
rate payments on government debt will be lower. This raises the possibility of reducing the
level of distortionary taxes, with the result of stimulating economic activity. The positive
eﬀects are further strengthened when allowing for a long-run equilibrium response of the real
interest rate and/or the net foreign asset position to changes in the targeted government
debt-to-output ratio. At the same time, we show that ﬁscal consolidation gives rise to
noticeable short-run adjustment costs, in contrast to what the literature on expansionary
ﬁscal consolidations suggests and regardless of the consolidation policy followed. Moreover,
in the presence of heterogenous households, and depending on the ﬁscal instrument used,
ﬁscal consolidation can have pronounced distributional eﬀects.7
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1 Introduction
Since the launch of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), deﬁcits and/or debt levels
in a number of euro area countries have been lastingly above the reference values of the
Maastricht Treaty, which obliges Member States of the European Union to avoid deﬁcits
exceeding 3% of GDP and debt levels above 60% of GDP. A breach of the reference values
initiates an Excessive Deﬁcit Procedure (EDP) with the aim of examining and correcting the
ﬁscal imbalance in the respective country. The Stability and Growth Pact—adopted in 1997
and reformed in 2005—complements the Maastricht Treaty by clarifying the mechanisms
of ﬁscal policy surveillance and co-ordination as well as the rules for the application of
the EDP.1 In this context, all EU Member States are obliged to provide annual stability
or convergence programmes with medium-term objectives for ﬁscal policies and, where
applicable, propose concrete adjustment paths towards their achievement.
Even though the public debate is largely centred on the EDP prescriptions for correcting
excessive deﬁcits, an EDP can also be launched in case the debt-to-GDP ratio exceeds the
reference value of 60%, unless it is diminishing and approaching the reference value at a
satisfactory pace. Indeed, amongst economists the debt level relative to GDP, rather than
the deﬁcit, is widely perceived as the more relevant criterion from a medium to long-run
sustainability point of view. For this reason, we focus our analysis on the prescriptions of
the existing European ﬁscal policy framework for the evolution of the debt-to-GDP ratio. In
particular, we employ a calibrated two-country open-economy model of the euro area—the
ECB’s New Area-Wide Model (NAWM), as described in Coenen et al. (2007)2—to examine
the long-run beneﬁts and the short-run adjustment costs of alternative debt consolidation
strategies.3 We model debt consolidation as a gradual reduction in the euro area debt
1For a comprehensive assessment of the Stability and Growth Pact and its reform see Morris et al. (2006).
2The speciﬁcation of the NAWM builds on recent advances in developing micro-founded dynamic stochas-
tic general equilibrium (DSGE) models suitable for quantitative policy analysis, as exempliﬁed by the closed-
economy model of the euro area by Smets and Wouters (2003), the International Monetary Fund’s Global
Economy Model (GEM; cf. Bayoumi et al., 2004) or the Federal Reserve Board’s new open economy model
named SIGMA (cf. Erceg et al., 2005). Thus, the NAWM incorporates numerous nominal and real rigidities
in an eﬀort to improve its empirical ﬁt regarding both the domestic and international dimension.
3In parallel to building the calibrated two-country version of the NAWM, a more parsimoniously speciﬁed
estimated version has been developed (cf. Christoﬀel et al., 2007). This version has been devised for forecast-
ing purposes but abstracts from many of the ﬁscal features considered in the analysis of ﬁscal consolidation
in the current paper.8
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ratio from its current value of about 70% to a value of 60%, and analyse both expenditure
and revenue-based consolidation policies that are implemented by means of simple ﬁscal
feedback rules.
In recent years, a large body of mostly empirical studies has explored the short-run
expansionary inﬂuences of ﬁscal consolidations on macroeconomic aggregates, notably con-
sumption and output. These studies have largely focused on the impact of government
expenditure cuts and suggest that, in contrast to the traditional Keynesian view, the tight-
ening of ﬁscal spending can stimulate economic activity in the short run.4 Several theoreti-
cal explanations of the so-called non-Keynesian eﬀects of government expenditure cuts have
been proposed in the literature (see, for example, Giavazzi and Pagano, 1990 and 1996;
Alesina and Perotti, 1997; Alesina and Ardagna, 1998; Perotti, 1999; and Ardagna, 2004).
A central explanation is based on the implied wealth eﬀect on consumption: restraining ﬁs-
cal spending may give rise to expectations of future tax cuts and hence a higher permanent
income on the part of households, which would stimulate private consumption and thereby
output. Another explanation focuses on the positive eﬀects of a fall in the risk premium
that can be brought about by reducing high levels of government debt, with lower interest
rates stimulating both consumption and investment. Regarding the role of revenue-based
ﬁscal consolidation, Blanchard (1990) points out that tax increases can also have an ex-
pansionary eﬀect on economic activity if they generate expectations of less dramatic tax
increases, or even tax reductions in the future.
Even though the literature suggests the existence of tradeoﬀs between the short and the
long-run eﬀects of ﬁscal consolidation policies, we are not aware of a systematic model-based
examination of the mechanisms behind their macroeconomic impact. In standard neoclassi-
cal models featuring a representative household, the role of ﬁscal policy is extremely limited
with government spending typically assumed to be exogenous and lump-sum taxes/transfers
balancing the ﬁscal authority’s budget. Thus, Ricardian equivalence holds and the precise
4Comprehensive surveys of the empirical literature on expansionary ﬁscal consolidations, with a focus on
European economies, can be found in Hemming et al. (2002) and Prammer (2004). Overall, the literature
comes to mixed conclusions and expansionary eﬀects of ﬁscal consolidations seem to pertain to particular
circumstances characterised by especially high levels of government debt or a credible change in the ﬁscal
regime.9
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level of government debt is inessential since the representative household anticipates the
future tax burden originating in the ﬁscal authority’s need to service, and eventually re-
pay government debt. The NAWM departs from this standard setting in two important
aspects. First, it distinguishes two types of households which diﬀer with respect to their
ability to participate in asset markets, with one type of household only holding money as
opposed to also trading bonds and accumulating physical capital. Due to the existence
of these two types of households, ﬁscal policies other than government spending—notably
transfers—have real eﬀects even though both types of households are optimising subject to
intertemporal budget constraints.5 Second, the NAWM incorporates a relative rich set of
distortionary taxes, including taxes on consumption purchases, labour and capital income,
as well as proﬁts, so that alternative ﬁscal policies, characterised by the use of distinct
instruments, can be analysed.
Employing the NAWM with its enhanced role for ﬁscal policy as a laboratory for exam-
ining the macroeconomic eﬀects of alternative ﬁscal consolidation strategies, we ﬁrst conﬁrm
that ﬁscal consolidation has positive long-run eﬀects on key macroeconomic aggregates such
as output and consumption, in particular when the resulting improvement in the budgetary
position is used to lower distortionary taxes. The key mechanism behind these positive
long-run eﬀects is the fact that a reduction in the amount of outstanding government debt
gives rise to an improvement in the ﬁscal authority’s budgetary position because interest
rate payments on government debt will be lower. This raises the possibility of reducing the
level of distortionary taxes, with the result of stimulating economic activity. The positive
eﬀects are further strengthened when allowing for a long-run equilibrium response of the
real interest rate and/or the net foreign asset position to changes in the targeted govern-
ment debt-to-output ratio. At the same time, we show that ﬁscal consolidation gives rise to
noticeable short-run adjustment costs, in contrast to what the literature on expansionary
ﬁscal consolidations suggests and regardless of the consolidation policy followed.6 Moreover,
5This setup extends the non-Ricardian framework proposed by Gal´ ı et al. (2007) and analysed empirically
in Coenen and Straub (2005) which assumes that one group of households is subject to liquidity constraints
and cannot even participate in the money market. These households follow a simple rule of thumb and just
consume their after-tax disposable income.
6The magnitude of the adjustment costs depends on the existence of nominal and real rigidities within
the NAWM. In the absence of these rigidities, ﬁscal consolidation policies would lead to adjustment paths10
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in the presence of heterogenous households, and depending on the ﬁscal instrument used,
ﬁscal consolidation may have pronounced distributional eﬀects.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Sections 2 brieﬂy reviews the
evolution of government-debt ratios in the euro area over the last twenty-ﬁve years. Section 3
provides a short description of the NAWM and devises alternative strategies for achieving
ﬁscal consolidation. Section 4 employs the NAWM to examine the long-run beneﬁts of
the alternative consolidation strategies, while Section 5 gauges the short-term adjustment
costs and the distributional eﬀects. Finally, Section 6 provides some additional sensitivity
analysis, and Section 7 summarises our conclusions.
2 The Evolution of Government Debt in the Euro Area
As documented in Table 1, the government debt-to-GDP ratio in the euro area followed
an upward trend over the 1980s and the ﬁrst half of the 1990s, eventually levelling oﬀ at
around 70% afterwards. The debt ratio continuously built up in the 1980s, not only during
periods of economic slowdown—as a tax-smoothing strategy would suggest—but also during
periods with buoyant growth. It exceeded 60% in 1992, continued to climb until 1996-97,
and declined slowly thereafter.
The evolution of the debt ratio for the euro area as a whole masks marked diﬀerences in
the development of debt ratios across the individual euro area countries. For example, while
a number of countries—notably those which experienced accelerating increases in their debt
ratios in the course of the 1980s and the ﬁrst half of the 1990s, such as Belgium and Italy—
introduced measures to curb and cut back public debt, other countries, such as France
and Germany, have hardly seen any signiﬁcant improvement in their ﬁscal positions so
far. Consequently, with the deceleration of consolidation eﬀorts observed over recent years
more widely—exceptions are Spain, Ireland and Finland—the need for ﬁscal consolidation
continues to weigh heavily on the euro area.
Figure 1 provides a more detailed analysis of the factors behind the evolution of the
that are characterised by sizeable impact responses and overshooting—outcomes that we consider as rather
implausible from an empirical perspective.11
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Table 1: Debt Ratios in the Euro Area and the European Union 1980-2005
1980 1990 1995 2000 2005
Euro area 33.75 7 .97 2 .26 9 .27 0 .8
Belgium 74.1 125.7 129.7 107.79 3 .3
Germany 31.24 2 .35 5 .55 9 .26 7 .7
Greece 20.83 5 .35 5 .15 6 .76 6 .8
Spain 16.44 2 .66 2 .55 9 .24 3 .2
France 20.83 5 .35 5 .15 6 .76 6 .8
Ireland 69.09 3 .18 1 .03 7 .82 7 .6
Italy 56.99 4 .7 121.2 109.2 106.4
Luxembourg 9.94 .75 .85 .36 .2
Netherlands 44.17 3 .77 4 .05 3 .65 2 .9
Austria 35.45 6 .16 7 .96 5 .86 3 .0
Portugal 30.65 5 .36 1 .05 0 .46 3 .9
Finland 11.41 4 .15 6 .54 4 .34 1 .1
EU15 37.85 3 .16 9 .56 3 .06 4 .6
Denmark 39.16 2 .07 2 .55 1 .73 5 .8
Sweden 40.04 2 .07 3 .05 2 .35 0 .3
United Kingdom 52.43 3 .55 1 .04 1 .24 2 .8
Notes: Debt ﬁgures in the Maastricht delineation, expressed in percent of GDP. The ﬁgures are based on
ESA (European System of Accounts) 79 until 1993 and on ESA 95 from 1994 onwards. Debt ﬁgures for
Germany before 1991 refer to West-Germany.
Source: European Commission, AMECO (Annual Macroeconomic Data) database Spring 2006.
euro area debt ratio from 1991 onwards by breaking it down into its various components:
the cyclically adjusted primary deﬁcit, the cyclical component of the primary deﬁcit, the
impact of the interest rate-growth diﬀerential—the so-called snowball eﬀect—and, as a
residual item, the stock-ﬂow adjustment.7 Throughout the period 1991-2005, the interest
rate-growth diﬀerential contributed to the build-up of the debt ratio, in particular during
the years 1993-1997, which are characterised by subdued growth and comparatively high
7The stock-ﬂow adjustment captures the eﬀects from the accumulation of ﬁnancial assets, changes in the
value of foreign debt due to exchange-rate changes and remaining statistical adjustments. While such eﬀects
do not inﬂuence the primary surplus, they do aﬀect the stock of debt. Indeed, over the period 1991-2005,
the stock-ﬂow adjustment had a positive impact for most of the period, explaining 7.7 percentage points of
the total increase in the debt ratio.12
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Stock Flow Adjustment Debt ratio
Stabilisation Gap
Notes: Debt ﬁgures according to the Maastricht deﬁnition. The ﬁgures are based on ESA (European
System of Accounts) 79 until 1993 and on ESA95 from 1994 onwards.
Source: European Commission, AMECO (Annual Macroeconomic Data) database Spring 2006, own com-
putations.
interest rates. The impact of unfavourable cyclical conditions shows up as well in the
positive contributions of the cyclical component of the primary deﬁcit in that period. Lower
cyclical deﬁcits or cyclical surpluses in subsequent years reﬂect the recovery in growth. The
improvements in growth, as well as steadily falling real interest rates, gave rise to a smaller
snowball eﬀect on the increase in the debt ratio thereafter.
In the period 1996-2000, we observe a signiﬁcant impact of ﬁscal consolidation measures
on the debt ratio, with cyclically adjusted primary surpluses varying between 2 and 3% of
GDP. However, the development of the “debt stabilisation gap”—deﬁned as the diﬀerence
between the debt-neutral primary deﬁcit, which would keep the debt ratio constant, and the
cyclically adjusted primary deﬁcit—indicates that an eﬀective structural reduction in the13
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debt ratio set in only in 1998 when the gap turned positive. In 2000, we observe the highest
contribution of ﬁscal policy measures to the reduction in the debt ratio, partly owing to
extraordinary proceeds from UMTS (Universal Mobile Telecommunications System) licence
sales, which accounted for additional revenues of about 1% of GDP in the euro area. The
stabilisation gap fell in subsequent years and turned negative again in 2002-2003, indicating
that the ﬁscal policy stance fell short of compensating for the autonomous increase in the
debt ratio induced by the interest rate-growth diﬀerential. Fiscal policies in the euro area
contributed only marginally to curbing public debt in 2004 and 2005 which then stabilised
around 70-71% of GDP.
In the following we will use the NAWM to examine the macroeconomic eﬀects of
alternative ﬁscal consolidation strategies aimed at gradually reducing the current debt-
to-GDP ratio of about 70% to 60%.
3 Fiscal Consolidation in the New Area-Wide Model
In this section, we ﬁrst provide a brief description of the New Area-Wide Model (NAWM),
with a particular emphasis on those features that give rise to a meaningful role for ﬁscal
policy. We then outline the implementation of the alternative ﬁscal consolidation strategies
that we want to analyse.8
3.1 A Sketch of the Model
The baseline version of the NAWM consists of two symmetric countries of diﬀerent size: the
euro area and the United States, the latter representing the rest of the industrialised world.
International linkages arise from the trade of goods and international assets, allowing for
imperfect exchange-rate pass-through and imperfect risk sharing. In each country, there
are four types of economic agents: households, ﬁrms, a ﬁscal and a monetary authority.
Extending the setup in Coenen and Straub (2005), the NAWM features two distinct types of
households which diﬀer with respect to their ability to participate in asset markets, with one
8While Appendix A provides additional information on the budget constraints of households and the
ﬁscal authority, together with a table summarising the calibration of the ﬁscal sector, the reader is referred
to Coenen et al. (2007) for a detailed description of the complete model and its calibration.14
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type of household only holding money as opposed to also trading bonds and accumulating
physical capital. Thus, also households with limited access to asset markets can smooth
consumption by adjusting their holdings of money. Nevertheless, due to the existence of
these two types of households, ﬁscal policies other than government spending—notably
transfers—have real eﬀects even though both types of households are optimising subject to
intertemporal budget constraints.9 Further, it is assumed that both types of households
supply diﬀerentiated labour services and act as wage setters in monopolistically competitive
markets by charging a markup over their marginal rate of substitution. Speciﬁcally, wage
setting is characterised by sticky nominal wages and indexation, eventually resulting in two
separate wage Phillips curves.
In calibrating the behaviour of the two types of households, we set the size of the group
of households with limited ability to participate in asset markets to one-fourth, in line with
the estimates reported in Coenen and Straub (2005), while all other structural parameters
are assumed to be identical across households. Moreover, in order to establish a more pro-
nounced role of transfer payments made by the ﬁscal authority, we assume that transfers, in
per-capita terms, are unevenly distributed across the two types of households, favouring the
constrained households with limited asset-market participation over the unconstrained ones
in a proportion of three to one. This also helps to guarantee that the levels of consumption
and hours worked are not too dissimilar across households.
Regarding ﬁrms, the NAWM distinguishes between producers of tradable diﬀerentiated
intermediate goods and producers of three non-tradable ﬁnal goods: a private consumption
good, a private investment good, and a public consumption good. The intermediate-good
producers sell their diﬀerentiated outputs in both domestic and foreign markets under mo-
nopolistic competition, while the ﬁnal-good producers operate under perfect competition
and take prices as given. It is assumed that the intermediate-good producers set diﬀerent
prices in domestic and foreign markets, by charging a markup over marginal cost but pricing
in local currency. In both markets, there is sluggish price adjustment due to staggered price
contracts and indexation, yielding two separate price Phillips curves.
9See Appendix A for details on the distinct budget constraints of the two types of households, highlighting
the diﬀerences between the intertemporal choices that they can make.15
ECB
Working Paper Series No 902
May 2008
The ﬁscal authority purchases units of the public consumption good and makes transfer
payments to the two types of households in unevenly distributed amounts. These expenses
are ﬁnanced by diﬀerent types of distortionary taxes, including taxes on consumption pur-
chases, labour and capital income, as well as proﬁts.10 A simple feedback rule is assumed
to stabilise the government debt-to-output ratio by appropriately adjusting a suitable ﬁscal
instrument. The alternative ﬁscal instruments that we consider are detailed below.
Finally, the monetary authority is assumed to follow an inertial Taylor-type interest-rate
rule featuring interest-rate smoothing, which is speciﬁed in terms of annual consumer-price
inﬂation and quarterly output growth.
3.2 Implementation
We model ﬁscal consolidation as a permanent reduction in the ﬁscal authority’s target for
the long-run debt-to-output ratio and analyse both expenditure and revenue-based consol-
idation strategies that are implemented by means of simple ﬁscal feedback rules.
On the expenditure side, we consider two alternative instruments: real transfers, TRr
t,
and real government consumption, Gr
t.11 In the case of a transfer-based consolidation
strategy, we assume that the ﬁscal authority adjusts real transfer payments as a fraction of
steady-state real output, trt = TRr









Y,t is the ﬁscal authority’s target for the government debt-to-output ratio, while
BY,t = Br
t/Y r refers to the ratio of real debt to steady-state real output. The term tr∗
t
denotes the debt-neutral level of the transfer ratio that, after all transient dynamics have
died out, is consistent with the target debt ratio B∗
Y,t.
Similarly, in the case of a consolidation strategy based on government consumption, we
assume that the ﬁscal authority adjusts real government consumption spending as a fraction
10See Appendix A for details on the ﬁscal authority’s budget constraint and the calibration of the model’s
ﬁscal sector.
11Note that, whenever we refer to a real quantity, the underlying nominal variable is deﬂated by the
model-based measure of the consumer price index.16
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t denotes the debt-neutral level of the government consumption ratio.
On the revenue side, we consider two alternative consolidation strategies that prescribe






























Here, sC,t and sWN,t refer to real private consumption expenditure (net of taxes) and (pre-
tax) real wage income (that is, the relevant tax bases), both deﬁned as a fraction of steady-




t denote the debt-neutral consumption and labour
income tax rates, respectively.
In the long run, a reduction in the amount of outstanding government debt, as implied
by the alternative consolidation strategies (1) to (4), gives rise to an improvement in the
budgetary position because interest rate payments on government debt will be lower. Such
an improvement in the budgetary position can ultimately be used to increase transfers or
government consumption, as captured by a rise in the debt-neutral expenditure ratios, tr∗
t
and g∗
t. Alternatively, it can be used to lower consumption and labour income taxes, as




t . As will be shown below,
these shifts in the debt-neutral levels of the ﬁscal instruments are the causes that do generate
the long-run beneﬁts of ﬁscal consolidation policies in our setting. Of course, one can also
consider combinations of the alternative consolidation strategies. For example, one may
want to implement an expenditure-based consolidation strategy, where the ﬁscal authority
uses the improvement in the budgetary position to reduce distortionary taxes in the long
run, while returning the expenditure ratio to the initial level.12
12Conceivably, the instruments at the disposal of the ﬁscal authority are much richer than the expenditure
and tax instruments considered in this study. For example, as pointed out to us by a referee, enhanced17
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Alternative frameworks, such as overlapping-generations models, may suggest even
larger eﬀects of ﬁscal consolidation policies by accounting for a dependency of the real
equilibrium interest rate on the level of government debt, which is absent in our setting.
To the extent that such a dependency has been widely documented in the empirical litera-
ture,13 we allow upward deviations of the targeted debt ratio from some neutral level, B0
Y ,
to have a direct, albeit small eﬀect on the real equilibrium interest rate, the latter being
equal to the inverse of the households’ discount rate in our model:
rr∗
t = β−1







Here, ηrr∗ > 0 measures the sensitivity of the real equilibrium rate to changes in the
targeted long-run debt ratio. In calibrating this sensitivity parameter, we choose a value of
0.625×10−3 which implies that a one percentage-point reduction in the annual government
debt ratio in excess of its neutral level results in a decline of the annualised equilibrium
interest rate by one basis point. This eﬀect is clearly at the lower end of the range of
estimates reported in the literature and should thus be seen as a cautious attempt to
capture the inﬂuence of government debt on the equilibrium real rate.14
Similarly, we allow for a link between government-debt imbalances and the desired net
holdings of foreign assets. Speciﬁcally, the desired net foreign asset position—expressed in
domestic currency and deﬁned relative to nominal steady-state output, B
F,∗
Y,t—is assumed












where ηBF,∗ > 0 measures the sensitivity of the desired net foreign asset position to changes
in the targeted debt ratio; and B
F,0
Y indicates the neutral net foreign asset position.
subsidies to ﬁrms’ research and development activities (R&D), while having an adverse impact on the ﬁscal
authority’s budget in the short run, are likely to make a positive contribution to consolidating the budget
in the longer term, to the extent that R&D subsidies would accelerate economic growth and ultimately
generate higher tax revenues. Similarly, shifting expenditure from government consumption to investment
would have beneﬁcial eﬀects on economic activity and tax revenues, even if the overall expenditure were to
remain unchanged (see Straub and Tchakarov, 2007, for an analysis based on the NAWM).
13For example, Laubach (2003), using US data over the 1985-2003 period, ﬁnds that a percentage-point
increase in the projected debt-to-GDP ratio raises expected long-term interest rates by about four to ﬁve
basis points. Similar ﬁndings are reported by Ardagna et al. (2005) and Kinoshita (2006) using panel data
for a large set of OECD countries.
14Of course, the sensitivity parameter itself may depend in a nonlinear fashion on the deviation of the
debt target from the neutral level, with higher levels of government debt having a disproportionately larger
eﬀect on the equilibrium rate.18
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By linking the net foreign asset position to changes in government debt, ﬁscal consol-
idation policies can have lasting eﬀects on the trade balance, which otherwise would need
to be oﬀset to guarantee that the actual net holdings of foreign assets would return to a
neutral level of zero.15 This reﬂects the fact that a desired net foreign asset position dif-
ferent from zero generates additional income for domestic households in form of returns on
the net holdings of foreign assets, even in the steady state.
Our speciﬁcation of the link between debt imbalances and the net foreign asset position
follows Faruqee et al. (2007). If the targeted debt ratio is lowered, the risk premium encoun-
tered by domestic investors will fall, leading to an increase in the net acquisition of foreign
assets. In calibrating this link, we assume B
F,0
Y = 0 and set the sensitivity parameter ηBF,∗
equal to 0.25, which is half the size of the value assumed in Faruqee et al. (2007), in line
with our cautious approach to capturing oﬀ-model eﬀects.
In the following, we will examine the long-run beneﬁts and the short-run adjustment
costs of the alternative consolidation strategies (1) to (4) using both the baseline version of
the NAWM and its extended version featuring an equilibrium real interest rate that varies
positively and a desired net foreign asset position that varies negatively with the targeted
debt ratio, as prescribed by equations (5) and (6), respectively.
In implementing the alternative consolidation strategies, we will assume that the ﬁs-
cal authority’s target for the debt-to-output ratio, B∗
Y,t, approaches the neutral level B0
Y
gradually according to the following law of motion:
B∗
Y,t =( 1 − ρB)B0
Y + ρB B∗
Y,t−1, (7)
starting from some initial value B∗
Y,t0.
We further assume that B0
Y =4× 60% and ﬁx ρB at 0.51/16, implying that half of
the adjustment in the targeted debt ratio is achieved after four years, three-fourth after
eight years and so on.16 Finally, regardless of the type of ﬁscal instrument used, we set
the feedback parameter φB equal to one. This guarantees that the actual debt ratio closely
15Technically, this is achieved by the introduction of a ﬁnancial intermediation cost—interpretable as a
“risk premium”—that is incurred by domestic households when trading in foreign assets. It depends on
the deviation of actual from desired net holdings of foreign assets and guarantees that the latter follow a
stationary process so that the model converges to a well deﬁned steady state.
16The duration of the consolidation aﬀects the adjustment dynamics, but not the steady state.19
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tracks the gradual reduction in the target ratio throughout the consolidation period.
4 Long-Run Beneﬁts of Fiscal Consolidation
In this section, we employ the NAWM to analyse the long-run eﬀects of a permanent reduc-
tion in the government debt-to-output ratio from 70 to 60%, as implied by the alternative
ﬁscal consolidation strategies discussed in the previous section. All eﬀects are reported as
percentage changes relative to the initial steady state, except for the eﬀects on the ﬁscal
instruments which are reported as percentage-point changes.
4.1 Baseline Results
In Table 2, we show the results for the baseline version of the NAWM. Interestingly, a
permanent reduction in government debt resulting from the transfer-based consolidation
strategy has a negative long-run eﬀect on output, despite the fact that lower government
debt and hence lower interest rate payments allow for an increase in ﬁscal transfers to
households by about 0.3% of steady-state output in the long run.17 The reason is that the
increase in transfers, which raises the disposable income of households, triggers a decline in
labour supply for any given wage rate.18 The initial reduction in labour supply is partly oﬀ-
set by an increase in the households’ after-tax real wage, but in equilibrium hours worked
are nonetheless somewhat lower than in the initial steady state. Given the fall in hours
worked, however, the marginal product of capital is reduced leading to a decline in invest-
ment and thus in the economy’s capital stock. Consequently, output decreases in the long
run. As economic activity falters, overall income falls and consumption, investment as well
as imports decline. With reduced imports, the relative price of imports must fall in order
to restore the long-run equilibrium which is characterised by balanced trade. The implied
improvement in the terms of trade (deﬁned as the domestic price of imports relative to the
price of exports in domestic currency) is accompanied by an even stronger fall in exports.
17Throughout, the notion of output refers to the model-based measure of real GDP, consistent with the
model’s aggregate resource constraint.
18Notice that the positive income eﬀect on the part of the unconstrained households is partly oﬀset by a
decline in their interest income. The latter eﬀect arises regardless of the particular consolidation strategy
chosen.20
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Table 2: Long-Run Eﬀects of Fiscal Consolidation in the Euro Area
Fiscal policy mix
(BY ,t r )( BY ,g )( BY ,τ C)( BY ,τ N)
Euro area
Output -0.13 0.14 0.04 0.12
Consumption -0.13 -0.27 0.04 0.11
Investment -0.09 0.13 0.03 0.08
Exports -0.11 0.02 0.03 0.10
Imports -0.04 0.01 0.01 0.03
Hours worked -0.15 0.15 0.04 0.14
Real wage
After-tax real wage 0.03 -0.01 0.41 0.65
Eﬀective labour cost 0.02 -0.00 -0.01 -0.02
Terms of trade -0.08 0.02 0.02 0.07
United States
Output -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01
Consumption -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01
Memo item
Fiscal instrument 0.29 0.25 -0.49 -0.51
Notes: For the baseline version of the NAWM, this table indicates the steady-state eﬀects on selected
domestic and foreign variables of a permanent reduction in government debt relative to output (BY )
from 70 to 60% using alternative ﬁscal instruments (transfers, tr, government consumption spending,
g, consumption tax, τ
C, and labour income tax, τ
N). All eﬀects are reported as percentage changes
relative to the initial steady state, except for the eﬀects on the ﬁscal instruments which are reported as
percentage-point changes.
Although of small size, the resulting eﬀect on output and consumption in the United States
(representing the rest of the industrialised world) is negative.
A diﬀerent picture emerges, if the ﬁscal authority uses government consumption expen-
diture as the instrument for achieving ﬁscal consolidation. In contrast to the transfer-based
strategy, which aﬀects aggregate outcomes indirectly through its eﬀect on the households’
budget constraints, the government consumption-based strategy has a direct positive long-
run impact on aggregate demand, as the improvement in the ﬁscal position results in an21
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increase in the debt-neutral level of government consumption by about 0.25% of steady-state
output. The increase in government consumption absorbs part of the economy’s resources,
thereby generating a negative wealth eﬀect on the part of households. As households feel
poorer, they cut back consumption purchases and increase labour supply. Given the in-
crease in labour supply, hours worked do rise in equilibrium, while real wages fall by a
small amount. Investment increases as the rise in hours worked has a positive impact on
the marginal product of capital, making investment more attractive. Consequently, as both
capital and labour services are used more intensely, output rises as well. The increase in
output enables the economy to increase exports, while the impact on imports is relatively
subdued mainly reﬂecting the decline in consumption purchases. To ensure balanced trade
in the long run, the relative price of exports needs to fall in equilibrium and hence the terms
of trade deteriorate.
Turning to the revenue based-consolidation strategies that are implemented using either
consumption or labour income taxes as ﬁscal instrument, we note that their qualitative ef-
fects are quite similar. This result is not surprising, as both instruments aﬀect the decisions
of households along the same consumption-leisure margin. Speciﬁcally, as lower interest
payments on government debt permit the ﬁscal authority to reduce either the consumption
or the labour income tax rate in the long run by about 0.5 percentage points, the opportu-
nity cost of leisure rises and hence households increase their supply of labour services. In
equilibrium, ﬁrms’ eﬀective labour costs fall while hours worked turn out to be higher. At
the same time, the households’ after-tax real wage increases markedly, reﬂecting the reduc-
tion in tax rates. The implied rise in households’ wage income boosts consumption under
both consolidation strategies. This eﬀect is further strengthened by the positive impact of
the increase in hours worked on the marginal product of capital, which in turn fosters capi-
tal accumulation. The increase in hours worked and the enhanced capital stock give rise to
higher output, matching the increase in aggregate demand. To balance the demand-driven
increase in imports, the terms of trade yet again need to worsen, which boosts exports
relative to imports.22
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4.2 Extended Results
In Table 3, we document the long-run eﬀects of the alternative ﬁscal consolidation strategies
that materialise in the modiﬁed version of the NAWM allowing for a long-run equilibrium
response of both the real interest rate and the net foreign asset position to changes in the
government debt-to-output ratio. While the economic mechanisms described above are still
present, it is apparent that the endogenous responses of the equilibrium real interest rate
and the desired net foreign asset position do enhance the eﬀectiveness of the alternative
consolidation strategies by a notable degree.
The increased eﬀectiveness of both expenditure and revenue-based consolidation policies
is best demonstrated by the strong positive eﬀect of ﬁscal consolidation on investment.19
The latter is about 1% higher when compared with the initial steady state, regardless
of the nature of the consolidation strategy. In general, the endogenous response of the
equilibrium real interest rate reduces the opportunity cost of investment. Accordingly,
capital accumulation is boosted. In addition, in all cases but one, the long-run eﬀects on
both hours worked and real wages are positive. The only exception is the transfer-based
consolidation policy. In this case, the decline in labour supply is pervasive, and the implied
increase in the real wage leads to an even stronger rise in ﬁrms’ eﬀective labour costs.
Another important observation is the sizeable eﬀect of ﬁscal consolidation on imports. This
eﬀect can be explained by recalling that, in the extended model, a decrease in euro area
government debt implies a rise in the desired net foreign asset position vis-` a-vis the United
States (representing the rest of the industrialised world). The resulting increase in interest
income on foreign assets enables domestic households to ﬁnance a lasting trade deﬁcit, with
imports being noticeably higher relative to the initial steady state.
In conclusion, regardless of the strategy chosen, the long-run eﬀects of ﬁscal consoli-
dation on economic activity are found to be positive, at least when taking into account a
small endogenous response of the equilibrium real interest rate and/or the net foreign asset
position. The eﬀects on output reach from around 0.2% in the case of a transfer-based
19The debt-neutral levels of transfers and government consumption, relative to steady-state output, rise
by about 0.3 and 0.25 percentage points, respectively, while the consumption and labour income tax rates
can be lowered by about 0.5 percentage points.23
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Table 3: Long-Run Eﬀects of Fiscal Consolidation with Endogenous Equilibrium Real
Interest Rate and Endogenous Net Foreign Asset Position
Fiscal policy mix
(BY ,t r )( BY ,g )( BY ,τ C)( BY ,τ N)
Euro area
Output 0.18 0.46 0.35 0.44
Consumption 0.04 -0.11 0.21 0.29
Investment 1.04 1.27 1.16 1.21
Exports 0.10 0.24 0.24 0.32
Imports 0.70 0.75 0.75 0.77
Hours worked -0.19 0.12 0.01 0.11
Real wage
After-tax real wage 0.36 0.33 0.76 1.00
Eﬀective labour cost 0.37 0.35 0.34 0.33
Terms of trade 0.08 0.17 0.18 0.22
United States
Output 0.06 0.07 0.07 0.07
Consumption -0.08 -0.06 -0.06 -0.05
Memo item
Fiscal instrument 0.30 0.25 -0.50 -0.52
Notes: For the extended version of the NAWM with an equilibrium real interest rate that varies positively
and a desired net foreign asset position that varies negatively with the target level of government debt, this
table indicates the steady-state eﬀects on selected domestic and foreign variables of a permanent reduction
in government debt relative to output (BY ) from 70 to 60% using alternative ﬁscal instruments (transfers,
tr, government consumption spending, g, consumption tax, τ
C, and labour income tax, τ
N). All eﬀects
are reported as percentage changes relative to the initial steady state, except for the eﬀects on the ﬁscal
instruments which are reported as percentage-point changes.
consolidation strategy to about 0.5% in the case that the ﬁscal authority uses either gov-
ernment consumption or the labour income tax as its instrument. When the improvement
in the ﬁscal position is used to lower distortionary taxes on either consumption purchases
or labour income, consumption increases by roughly 0.25%.
Nevertheless, while the overall impact is positive in the long run, a comprehensive anal-
ysis of the alternative ﬁscal consolidation strategies also requires considering the implied24
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short-run adjustment costs, as well as distributional eﬀects, that may vary across strategies
considerably. This will be the focus of the next section.
5 Short-Run Adjustment Costs and Distributional Eﬀects
While a reduction in government debt enables the ﬁscal authority to increase expenditure
and/or to reduce taxes in the long run, ﬁscal consolidation usually requires a substantial
cut in expenditure or a signiﬁcant rise in tax rates in the short run. Therefore, in order to
provide a comprehensive analysis, we must consider also the adjustment costs and, possibly,
the distributional eﬀects that alternative ﬁscal strategies may generate.
Obviously, the short-run adjustment costs implied by ﬁscal consolidation policies depend
in important ways on the timing and the horizon of their implementation. Here, we assume
that the reduction in government debt is gradually phased in—in line with the provisions of
the ﬁscal policy framework in the euro area—but fully anticipated. Speciﬁcally, we assume
that half of the reduction in the ﬁscal authority’s debt target occurs in the course of the
ﬁrst four years, that three-fourth are implemented by the end of the eighth year, and so
on.20 Moreover, we assume that the gradual reduction in the debt target is instantaneously
matched by adjustments in the debt-neutral level of the respective instrument.
5.1 The Main Mechanisms
To facilitate the understanding of the adjustment dynamics triggered by our alternative
consolidation strategies, we ﬁrst provide a short description of the main economic mech-
anisms through which expenditure and revenue-based consolidation aﬀects the economy
intertemporally. A more detailed discussion then follows in the next two sections.
First, expenditure-based consolidation policies, which operate through changes in ei-
ther transfers or government consumption, aﬀect macroeconomic outcomes mainly through
their impact on households’ wealth and the implied responses of labour supply and private
consumption. More speciﬁcally, expenditure-based consolidation has either a sizeable di-
rect eﬀect (in the case of transfers) or a marked indirect eﬀect (in the case of government
20See Appendix B for the derivation of a consolidation path in the euro area, assuming that the individual
euro area countries pursue ﬁscal policies in accordance with the European framework of ﬁscal surveillance.25
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consumption) on the intertemporal budget constraints of households, and thereby on their
permanent income. If permanent income declines, the households will choose less consump-
tion and less leisure and thereby increase labour supply. The converse holds in the case
of an increase in permanent income. Thus, the households’ choices for consumption and
labour supply move in opposite directions after income shocks, reﬂecting the fact that both
consumption and leisure are normal goods.
Second, and in contrast to the ﬁrst mechanism, revenue-based consolidation policies
aﬀect macroeconomic outcomes mainly by changing the intertemporal price of consumption
and leisure for households. Speciﬁcally, in our setting the revenue-based consolidation
policies imply, after a signiﬁcant initial rise to achieve consolidation, a gradual decline in
distortionary taxes. As a result, forward-looking households that anticipate this decline
have an incentive to postpone both consumption and labour supply.
5.2 Expenditure-Based Consolidation
Focusing on the extended version of the NAWM, Figure 2 exhibits the proﬁle of the short-
run adjustment dynamics for the expenditure-based consolidation policies, while Figure 3
depicts the implied distributional eﬀects.
Starting with the eﬀects of the transfer-based ﬁscal consolidation policy, Figure 2 re-
veals that the pronounced initial reduction in transfers needed to bring down government
debt results in a rather modest fall in output. This fall in output is caused by a sharp
decline in consumption, whereas both investment and net trade rise. As shown in Figure 3,
the reduction in transfers has a considerably stronger impact on the constrained household
with limited access to asset markets (i.e., household J). The sign and the magnitude of
the household-speciﬁc responses to changes in the ﬁscal stance are largely shaped by the
asymmetric distribution of transfers in the model. In particular, the members of the con-
strained household respond to the initial decline in transfer income by strongly reducing
consumption purchases. At the same time, despite a substantially lower real wage, they
increase the number of hours worked in an attempt to smooth consumption by increasing
their wage income. In contrast, consumption purchases on the part of the unconstrained
household are largely unaﬀected by the fall in transfers, even though hours worked and real26
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Figure 2: Adjustment Dynamics of Expenditure-Based Consolidation Policies
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Notes: For the extended version of the NAWM with an endogenous equilibrium real interest rate and
an endogenous desired net foreign asset position, this ﬁgure depicts the adjustment dynamics of selected
domestic variables following a gradually phased-in permanent reduction in the government debt-to-output
ratio from 70 to 60% using alternative expenditure-based ﬁscal instruments. All dynamic eﬀects are re-
ported as percentage deviations from the initial steady state, except for the eﬀects on the ﬁscal instruments
and the trade balance-to-output ratio which are reported as percentage-point changes.27
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Figure 2: Adjustment Dynamics of Expenditure-Based Consolidation Policies (cont.)

















wages fall. This reﬂects the favourable prospects of higher capital income in the future.
Hence, the unconstrained household increases investment purchases, anticipating positive
developments in the opportunity cost of capital formation that are triggered by the en-
dogenous decline in the equilibrium real interest rate. The fall in aggregate consumption,
which outweighs the increase in investment over short and medium-term horizons, dampens
imports and hence gives rise to a temporary trade balance surplus. The improvement in the
trade balance is accompanied by a depreciation of the terms of trade. To the extent that
the desired net foreign asset position increases following the reduction in government debt,
the trade balance surplus declines gradually, resulting eventually in a lasting trade deﬁcit
ﬁnanced by higher interest rate earnings on the domestic holdings of foreign assets.
Considering the adjustment dynamics in the case of a consolidation policy based on ad-
justments in government consumption, we observe a persistent fall in output which exceeds
-2 percent initially, while consumption is found to be hardly aﬀected. This subdued eﬀect
on consumption arises because the consumption responses on the part of the two types of
households largely oﬀset each other. While the positive wealth eﬀect induced by the reduc-
tion in government spending helps the unconstrained household to stabilise consumption
purchases, a marked decline in wage income leads to a sizeable reduction in consumption28
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Figure 3: Distributional Eﬀects of Expenditure-Based Consolidation Policies
Transfers Government Consumption




















































Notes: For the extended version of the NAWM with an endogenous equilibrium real interest rate and
an endogenous desired net foreign asset position, this ﬁgure depicts the distributional eﬀects on selected
household-speciﬁc variables of a gradually phased-in permanent reduction in the government debt-to-
output ratio from 70 to 60% using alternative expenditure-based ﬁscal instruments All dynamic eﬀects are
reported as percentage deviations from the initial steady state.29
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purchases on the part of the constrained household. The decline in wage income, which
aﬀects both types of households alike, reﬂects the shortfall in aggregate demand following
the reduction in government consumption which in turn triggers a decline in both hours
worked and real wages. The responses of the remaining variables are largely similar to those
observed for the transfer-based consolidation strategy.
Overall, the main diﬀerence concerning the eﬀects of the government consumption-
based consolidation strategy relative to the eﬀects of the transfer-based strategy relates to
the negative impact of the former strategy on aggregate demand. The decline in aggregate
demand results in a strong and persistent fall in labour demand, an eﬀect which is not
generated in the case of the transfer-based strategy.
5.3 Revenue-Based Consolidation
We now turn to the analysis of the adjustment dynamics and the distributional eﬀects gen-
erated by the revenue-based consolidation strategies. The relevant ﬁndings are summarised
in Figures 4 and 5 below.
When using the consumption tax as the ﬁscal instrument, the desired reduction in
government debt requires a sharp initial increase in the consumption tax rate. In our
set up, the response of the consumption tax rate peaks at about 3.5 percentage points,
before gradually approaching its new debt-neutral level below the initial steady state.21
The increase in the consumption tax rate today, and the anticipation of a lower tax rate
in the future, dampens aggregate consumption in the short to medium run, while boosting
investment lastingly. The reason is that the anticipated decline in the consumption tax
increases the price of consumption today relative to the price of consumption in the future.22
Both types of households cut back consumption purchases in the course of the adjustment
process. However, while the unconstrained household reduces the number of hours worked,
the constrained household tends to work even more. This diﬀerent pattern reﬂects the
fact that the permanent income of the unconstrained household increases in view of the
21To ascertain that the increase in the consumption tax rate is not unrealistic recall that the value-added
tax in Germany was raised by 3 percentage points in 2007.
22Speciﬁcally, a change in the consumption tax rate acts likes a persistent preference shock, as discussed
for instance in Smets and Wouters (2003).30
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Figure 4: Adjustment Dynamics of Revenue-Based Consolidation Policies
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Notes: For the extended version of the NAWM with an endogenous equilibrium real interest rate and
an endogenous desired net foreign asset position, this ﬁgure depicts the adjustment dynamics of selected
domestic variables following a gradually phased-in permanent reduction in the government debt-to-output
ratio from 70 to 60% using alternative revenue-based ﬁscal instruments. All dynamic eﬀects are reported
as percentage deviations from the initial steady state, except for the eﬀects on the ﬁscal instruments and
the trade balance-to-output ratio which are reported as percentage-point changes.31
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Figure 4: Adjustment Dynamics of Revenue-Based Consolidation Policies (cont.)

















rise in the economy’s capital stock, while the constrained household needs to rely mainly
on adjusting the supply of labour services to smooth consumption. This in turn explains
the more drawn out response of consumption on the part of the unconstrained household
following the increase in the consumption tax. By means of its eﬀect on imports, the
dynamic response of aggregate consumption shapes the response of the trade balance, which
records an initial surplus that gradually turns into a deﬁcit as consumption approaches its
new steady state.
Finally, using the labour income tax as ﬁscal instrument, the initial increase in the tax
rate on labour income amounts to roughly 3 percentage points. While both consumption
and labour income taxes aﬀect the marginal rate of substitution between consumption
and leisure, the labour income tax does not inﬂuence directly the intertemporal price of
consumption. Consequently, consumption falls by less, whereas the rise in labour income
taxes discourages work eﬀort more persistently. It also gives rise to a noticeable decline in
investment. The negative responses of both consumption and investment translate into a
persistent negative response of output, while the decline in labour supply leads to rise in
(pre-tax) real wages in equilibrium.
Comparing the alternative revenue-based consolidation policies, it is interesting to point32
ECB
Working Paper Series No 902
May 2008
Figure 5: Distributional Eﬀects of Revenue-Based Consolidation Policies
Consumption Tax Labour Income Tax




















































Notes: For the extended version of the NAWM with an endogenous equilibrium real interest rate and
an endogenous desired net foreign asset position, this ﬁgure depicts the distributional eﬀects on selected
household-speciﬁc variables of a gradually phased-in permanent reduction in the government debt-to-
output ratio from 70 to 60% using alternative revenue-based ﬁscal instruments. All dynamic eﬀects are
reported as percentage deviations from the initial steady state.33
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out the diﬀerences in the response of the trade balance and the terms of trade. First, the
increase in the consumption tax rate results in a sharper fall in consumption, causing a
more pronounced drop in imports and thus a larger improvement in the trade balance. The
resulting trade balance surplus is accompanied by a sizeable deterioration of the terms of
trade. Second, the increase in the labour income tax has not only a negative impact on
consumption and hours worked, but also on investment, reducing at least temporarily the
production capacity of the economy during the adjustment towards the new steady state.
The latter leads to a persistent reduction of both import and export volumes resulting
in a somewhat lower trade surplus. Overall, as the negative impact on exports is more
pronounced and more persistent, the relative price of exports needs to rise generating a
temporary improvement in the terms of trade and limiting thereby the negative impact of
the increase in the labour income tax on the trade balance.
6 Sensitivity Analysis
We ﬁnally provide some additional sensitivity analysis regarding the importance of the
assumed duration of the alternative ﬁscal consolidation policies for our results. To this end,
we vary the time horizon over which the ﬁscal authority intends to reach the new target for
the government debt ratio.
Table 4 reports the minima of output, consumption and hours worked within the ﬁrst 16
quarters following the implementation of the diﬀerent consolidation policies as well as the
cumulated impact over the ﬁrst 16 quarters. As expected, a shorter consolidation period
(measured by the consolidation half-life; that is, the time by which half of the reduction in
the targeted debt ratio is accomplished) gives rise to larger output and consumption losses
and a larger decline in hours worked. We note that the quarter in which the minimum
is reached is not very much aﬀected by the length of the consolidation period, with the
exception of the labour income tax-based consolidation. Furthermore, the impact on the
minima of changing the length of the consolidation period is roughly proportional: doubling
the duration of the consolidation period scales down the short-run eﬀects by around a factor
of 2 in case that transfers, government consumption or consumption taxes are used as the34
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Table 4: Adjustment Cost of Fiscal Consolidation Measures in the Euro Area
Half-life of consolidation in quarters
16 quarters 8q u a r t e r s 32 quarters
Fiscal Cum. Cum. Cum.
policy mix Minimum impact Minimum impact Minimum impact
Output -0.42 (4) 2.20 -0.99 (4) 0.74 -0.14 (4) 2.08
(BY ,t r ) Consumption -1.37 (5) -12.79 -2.54 (4) -20.78 -0.70 (6) -7.16
Hours worked -0.13 (3) 5.35 -0.54 (3) 4.69 – – 4.30
Output -2.02 (4) -17.01 -3.89 (4) -28.90 -1.02 (5) -8.97
(BY ,g ) Consumption -0.06 (5) -0.28 -0.19 (5) -1.32 -0.02 (7) 0.00
Hours worked -1.57 (4) -12.20 -3.17 (4) -22.51 -0.73 (5) -5.63
Output -0.62 (5) -4.60 -1.24 (5) -8.56 -0.31 (6) -2.22
(BY ,τ C) Consumption -1.64 (6) -19.02 -2.79 (5) -29.21 -0.96 (7) -11.42
Hours worked -0.38 (5) -2.05 -0.90 (5) -5.58 -0.14 (6) -0.23
Output -0.49 (12) -6.06 -0.59 (9) -7.56 -0.36 (13) -4.29
(BY ,τ N) Consumption -0.76 (9) -10.30 -0.93 (6) -12.11 -0.63 (12) -8.40
Hours worked -0.49 (13) -5.61 -0.63 (10) -7.76 -0.32 (15) -3.40
Notes: For the extended version of the NAWM with an endogenous equilibrium interest real interest rate
and an endogenous desired net foreign asset position, this tables indicates summary statistics characterising
the adjustment cost that are incurred when implementing a gradually phased-in permanent reduction in
government debt relative to output (BY ) from 70 to 60% using alternative ﬁscal instruments (transfers,
tr, government consumption spending, g, consumption tax, τ
C, and labour income tax, τ
N). The length
of the consolidation period is measured by the consolidation half-life h (with h =1 6 ,8o r3 2q u a r t e r s ) ;
that is, the time by which half of the reduction in the debt-to-output ratio is accomplished. The minimum
indicates the lowest value within the ﬁrst h quarters, with ﬁgures in parentheses denoting the quarter in
which the minimum is attained. The cumulated impact indicates percentage deviations from the initial
steady state, cumulated over the ﬁrst h quarters. In the case of the transfer-based consolidation strategy
with h = 32, the eﬀect on hours worked is positive over the ﬁrst h = 32 quarters and therefore the minimum
is not reported.
instrument, and by a factor of about 1.5 in case the labour income tax is used. This reﬂects
the fact that the eﬀects arising from the nonlinearities in the model are rather modest.
7 Conclusions
While there is a broad consensus amongst policymakers in the euro area that ﬁscal im-
balances, as exempliﬁed by excessive government debt-to-GDP ratios, are detrimental to35
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growth and macroeconomic stability, there is still a lack of common understanding of the
nature of the long-run beneﬁts and the short-run costs of ﬁscal consolidation. To shed some
light on these issues from the perspective of a modern microfounded model, we examined
the macroeconomic eﬀects of alternative consolidation policies using the NAWM.
Regarding the potential long-run beneﬁts of ﬁscal consolidation, we demonstrated that
both expenditure and revenue-based consolidation measures can have an economically sig-
niﬁcant impact on macroeconomic aggregates, at least in an extended version of our model
with endogenous responses of the equilibrium real interest rate and the net foreign asset
position to reductions in government debt. Depending on the implemented consolidation
scheme, however, there are notable diﬀerences in the magnitude, and sometimes also in the
sign, of the long-run responses of macroeconomic variables. For example, revenue-based con-
solidation policies, characterised by changes in distortionary consumption or labour income
taxes, generate positive long-run responses of output, consumption, investment and hours
worked. In contrast, expenditure-based policies associated with adjustments in transfers
and government spending, while having positive long-run eﬀects on output and investment,
diﬀer regarding their long-run eﬀects on consumption and hours worked. In particular,
a transfer-based consolidation policy leads to a fall in hours worked, while a government
consumption-based consolidation policy dampens private consumption.
Furthermore, we evaluated the potential short-run costs of alternative ﬁscal consolida-
tion measures and the implied distributional eﬀects by analysing the adjustment paths of
key macroeconomic variables following the announcement of a gradual reduction in gov-
ernment debt. We demonstrated that ﬁscal consolidation policies, in general, give rise to
noticeable short-run adjustment costs in contrasts to what the literature on expansionary
ﬁscal consolidations suggests. Moreover, we showed that ﬁscal consolidation policies may
have pronounced distributional eﬀects to the extent that households diﬀer with regard to
their ability to participate in asset markets and their dependence on ﬁscal transfers. How-
ever, the magnitude of both short-run adjustment costs and distributional eﬀects are found
to depend in important ways on the particular consolidation strategy.
Obviously, the objective of our paper has been to provide a positive analysis of the36
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macroeconomic eﬀects of alternative ﬁscal consolidation policies. A normative analysis
would depend on how society weighs the long-run beneﬁts of ﬁscal reforms relative to the
short-run adjustments costs and possible distributional eﬀects. This could be an interesting
extension of our paper which we leave for future research.37
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Appendix A
This appendix provides details on the distinct budget constraints of the two types of house-
holds in an attempt to highlight the diﬀerences between the intertemporal choices that they
can make. The two households—denoted by I and J—are of normalised size 1 − ω and ω,
respectively, with ω generally being referred to as the fraction of households with limited
ability to participate in asset markets. The appendix also reports the budget constraint of
the ﬁscal authority and details the calibration of the ﬁscal sector. For a detailed description
of the complete model and its calibration see Coenen et al. (2007).
The Households’ Budget Constraints
The members of household I are indexed by i ∈ [0, 1 − ω ]. They have access to ﬁnancial
markets, where they buy and sell domestic government bonds, Bi,t+1, and internationally
traded bonds, BF
i,t+1. They accumulate physical capital, Ki,t, the services of which they
rent out to ﬁrms, and hold money, Mi,t, for transaction purposes. The various assets enable
the members of household I to smooth consumption over time.
In choosing their allocations, the members of household I face the following period-by-
period budget constraint:
(1 + τC
t +Γ v(vi,t))PC,t Ci,t + PI,tIi,t (A.1)
+R−1
t Bi,t+1 + ((1 − ΓBF(BF
t ))RF
t )−1St BF
i,t+1 + Mi,t +Ξ i,t +Φ i,t
=( 1 − τN
t − τ
W h
t ) Wi,t Ni,t +( 1− τK
t )(RK
t ui,t − Γu(ui,t)PI,t)Ki,t
+τK
t δP I,tKi,t +( 1− τD
t )Di,t + TRi,t + Bi,t + St BF
i,t + Mi,t−1,
where PC,t and PI,t are the prices of a unit of the private consumption good and the invest-
ment good, respectively, while Ci,t and Ii,t represent the household member’s purchases of
those goods. Rt and RF
t denote, respectively, the risk-less returns on domestic government
bonds and internationally traded bonds. Internationally traded bonds are denominated in
foreign currency and, thus, their domestic value depends on the nominal exchange rate St
(expressed in terms of units of home currency per unit of foreign currency). Ni,t denotes
the labour services provided to ﬁrms at wage rate Wi,t; RK
t indicates the rental rate for the
eﬀective capital services rent to ﬁrms, ui,t Ki,t,a n dDi,t are the dividends paid by household-
owned ﬁrms. As regards the provision of eﬀective capital services, varying the intensity of
capital utilisation is subject to a proportional cost Γu(ui,t).
The purchases of the consumption good are subject to a proportional transaction cost,
Γv(vi,t), which depends on consumption-based velocity, vi,t =( 1+τC
t )PC,tCi,t/Mi,t;t h a t
is, the inverse of the household member’s money-to-consumption ratio. Similarly, ΓBF(BF
t )
represents a ﬁnancial intermediation premium that the household member must pay when
taking a position in the international bond market. The incurred premium is rebated in a
lump-sum manner, which is indicated by Ξi,t.40
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The ﬁscal authority absorbs part of the gross income of the household member to ﬁnance
its expenditure. In this context, τC




t are the tax rates levied on the diﬀerent sources of household
income; that is, wage income Wi,t Ni,t, rental capital income RK
t Ki,t and dividend income
Di,t. Here, we assume that the utilisation cost of physical capital, Γu(ui,t), and physical
capital depreciation, δK i,t, are exempted from taxation. τ
W h
t is the additional pay-roll tax
rate levied on wage income (representing the household member’s contribution to social
security). The term TRi,t indicates transfer payments from the ﬁscal authority.
Finally, it is assumed that household member i holds state-contingent securities, Φi,t.
These securities are traded amongst all members of household I and provide insurance
against individual wage-income risk. This guarantees that the marginal utility of consump-
tion out of wage income is identical across individual household members. As a result, all
members of household I will choose identical allocations in equilibrium.23
The members of household J are indexed by j ∈ (1− ω, 1]. They cannot trade in
ﬁnancial and physical assets. Nevertheless, they can intertemporally smooth consumption
by adjusting their holdings of money, albeit to a limited extent. Thus, the members of
household J are subject to the following period-by-period budget constraint:
(1 + τC
t +Γ v(vj,t))PC,t Cj,t + Mj,t (A.2)
=( 1 − τN
t − τ
W h
t ) Wj,t Nj,t + TRj,t + Mj,t−1 +Φ j,t
with notation completely analogous to that for the members of household I.
The Fiscal Authority’s Budget Constraint
Aggregating across households, the ﬁscal authority’s period-by-period budget constraint has
the following form:
PG,t Gt + TRt + Bt + Mt−1 (A.3)
= τC
















t ut − (Γu(ut)+δ)PI,t)Kt + τD
t Dt + R−1
t Bt+1 + Mt,
where all quantities are expressed in per-capita-terms, with the exception of labour services
and wages, which are diﬀerentiated across the members of the two households. Accordingly,
the ﬁscal authority purchases units of a public consumption good, Gt with a unit price PG,t,
makes transfer payments TRt, issues bonds to reﬁnance its debt, Bt, earns seignorage on
outstanding money holdings, Mt−1, and raises taxes with details on the latter given above,
except for the ﬁrms’ contribution rate to social security, denoted by τ
W f
t , which is charged
on ﬁrms’ labour cost Wt Nt.
23The existence of state-contingent securities is assumed for analytical convenience and renders the model
tractable under staggered wage setting when household members are supplying diﬀerentiated labour services.41
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The Calibration of the Fiscal Sector
The NAWM’s ﬁscal sector is calibrated so that it is consistent with the “neutral” Maastricht
reference value for the debt-to-output ratio of BY =4 ×60% in steady state. The calibration
of the government consumption-to-output ratio (g) is based on national accounts data, while
the values for the tax rates on households’ consumption purchases (τC) and labour income
(τN), and for households’ and ﬁrms’ contribution rates to social security (τW h and τW f), are
taken from OECD sources (cf. OECD, 2004a, 2004b). In contrast, the tax rate on capital
income (τK) is calibrated such that it brings the implied investment-to-output ratio in line
with the national accounts, while the tax rate on dividend income (τD) is set to zero for
simplicity. Finally, the transfers-to-output ratio (tr) is chosen so that the ﬁscal authority’s
budget is balanced at the neutral debt-to-output ratio.
Table A: The Steady-State Calibration of the Fiscal Sector within the NAWM
Value
Parameter Euro area United States Description
BY 240.0 240.0 Government debt-to-output ratio
g 18.0 16.0 Government consumption-to-output ratio
tr 19.5† 8.0† Government transfers-to-output ratio
τC 18.3 7.7 Consumption tax rate
τN 12.2 15.4 Labour income tax rate
τW h 11.8 7.1 Social security rate of households
τW f 21.9 7.1 Social security rate of ﬁrms
τK 18.4‡ 18.4‡ Capital income tax rate
τD 0.0 0.0 Dividend tax rate
Notes: This table summarises the steady-state calibration of the NAWM’s ﬁscal sector. The superscript ‘
†’
indicates that the transfer ratio tr has been calibrated such that the ﬁscal authority’s budget is balanced at
the neutral debt-to-output ratio BY , whereas the superscript ‘
‡’ indicates that the capital income tax rate
has been chosen such that the implied investment-to-output ratio is consistent with the national accounts.42
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Appendix B
In this appendix, we derive a plausible path for debt consolidation in the euro area, as-
suming that the euro area countries pursue ﬁscal policies in accordance with the European
framework of ﬁscal surveillance. Speciﬁcally, in line with the prescriptions of the Excessive
Deﬁcit Procedure (EDP), we assume that countries subject to an EDP (Germany, France,
Italy, Greece, and Portugal) adjust their budget balances following the respective Council
recommendations. Countries not in excessive deﬁcit but with budgetary imbalances are as-
sumed to adjust their deﬁcits by 0.50% of GDP until a budgetary position close to balance
or in surplus is achieved. The remaining countries (Ireland, Finland, and Luxembourg)
would not adjust.
Table B.1: Projected Deﬁcit Adjustments in the Euro Area 2006-2009
2006 2007 2008 2009
Euro area 0.50 .40 .40 .4
Belgium 0.00 .00 .00 .0
Germany 0.50 .50 .50 .5
Greece 1.50 .50 .50 .5
Spain 0.00 .00 .00 .0
France 0.50 .50 .50 .5
Ireland 0.00 .00 .00 .0
Italy 0.80 .80 .50 .5
Luxembourg 0.50 .50 .00 .0
Netherlands 0.00 .00 .00 .0
Austria 0.50 .50 .00 .0
Portugal 0.70 .70 .70 .5
Finland 0.00 .00 .00 .0
Notes: All ﬁgures in percent of GDP. In the case of Germany, the Council recommendation foresees a
budgetary improvement by 1% of GDP cumulatively in the period 2006-2007.
Source: Own computations.
As indicated in Table B.1, these requirements imply a reduction in the euro area deﬁcit-
to-GDP ratio by 0.50 percentage points in 2006, and by 0.40 percentage points in each year
over the period 2007-2009. The implied primary surplus triggers a decline in the debt ratio
to the extent that it exceeds the debt-neutral primary surplus.24
24The debt neutral primary surplus would keep the debt ratio constant. It is computed assuming a
potential output growth rate of 1.7%, a trend inﬂation rate of 2%, and an interest rate on government bonds
of 5%.43
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Table B.2: Projected Decline in the Euro Area Debt Ratio 2005-2013
Primary surplus Debt
Debt-neutral
Year Change Level level Change Level
2005 0.97 0 .70
2006 0.51 .40 .92 −0.48 70.22
2007 0.41 .80 .91 −0.89 69.33
2008 0.42 .20 .90 −1.30 68.03
2009 0.42 .60 .88 −1.72 66.32
2010 0.02 .60 .86 −1.74 64.58
2011 0.02 .60 .84 −1.76 62.82
2012 0.02 .60 .82 −1.78 61.04
2013 0.02 .60 .79 −1.81 59.23
Notes: All ﬁgures in percent of GDP. The debt-neutral primary surplus would keep the debt ratio constant.
It is computed on the basis of a potential growth rate of 1.7%, a trend inﬂation rate of 2%, and an interest
rate on government bonds of 5%.
Source: Own computations.
Table B.2 shows that the debt ratio would fall to below the 60% reference value of
the Maastricht Treaty after 8 years, broadly in line with the pattern of the gradual ﬁscal
consolidation strategies that we consider in this paper.44
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